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19781 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ples underlying the date-of-payment rule are actually nothing more
than judicially created fictions,"' the Bay Ridge Court's deference
to the legislature115 and concomitant reluctance to repudiate this
rule are difficult to justify.1
Thomas M. Dawson
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Representation by layman held not to deprive accused of right to
counsel
The right to counsel embodied in the sixth amendment' has
been interpreted to include the right to effective representation by
counsel at trial."" While it is clear that incompetent advocacy by a
14 See note 91 supra.
' 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
"' Professor Occhialino's recognition of the conflict between post-Dole third-party prac-
tice principles and a date-of-payment accrual led him to propose that Dole claims be deemed
to accrue when the defendant in the underlying action is served with process. Contribution,
supra note 91, at 231. This proposal has several practical advantages. For example, all claims
arising from a single incident would more likely be tried in one proceeding, thereby minimiz-
ing the impact on already crowded dockets and simplifying the apportionment of fault among
the parties. Id. Where the claimant seeks contribution from the state, of course, adoption of
a date-of-service rule would alleviate much of the prejudice to the state resulting from adher-
ence to date-of-payment accrual. See note 111 supra. Moreover, the tortfeasor served with
process would not be placed at a disadvantage, since he will generally be aware at the time
of service of any contribution rights he might have against joint tortfeasors. Contribution,
supra note 91, at 231. Professor Occhialino also suggested a specific 1-year limitation period
for Dole claims, but acknowledged the "element of arbitrariness" inherent in the choice of
time period. Id. at 233.
.. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. As early as 1932, the Supreme Court characterized represen-
tation by counsel in capital cases as "vital and imperative." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932). In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), however, the Court stated flatly that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" in all criminal
cases. Id. at 471. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) the Court expressly
overruled Betts, holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel was applicable to state
felony proceedings through the fourteenth amendment. Thereafter, the Court extended the
right to counsel to all criminal prosecutions involving a potential deprivation of liberty. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For a critical analysis of the results of these
decisions, see Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976).
"I McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see People v. LaBree, 34 N.Y.2d
257, 313 N.E.2d 730, 357 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1974); People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 280
N.E.2d 637, 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1972). The Supreme Court has declined to establish
specific standards for determining whether "effective representation" has been provided. See
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In New York, the courts have utilized the
"mockery of justice" test articulated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Under
this test, the defendant has the burden of showing that his attorney made glaring errors that
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licensed attorney is not sufficient to satisfy the "effective represen-
tation" requirement,"' it has remained uncertain whether compe-
tent representation by an unlicensed practitioner fulfills the consti-
tutional mandate. Recently, in People v. Felder,'2 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that, where the legal services
provided were otherwise effective, the fact that a criminal defen-
prejudiced his case. See, e.g., People v. LaBree, 34 N.Y.2d 257, 313 N.E.2d 730, 357 N.Y.S.2d
412 (1974); People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972);
People v. Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 361, 165 N.E.2d 557, 558, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (1960); People
v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 354, 165 N.E.2d 551, 553-54, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697, 701 (1960). The
"mockery of justice" test has been criticized as "requiring such a minimal level of perform-
ance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment." Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 1, 28 (1973). In response to such criticism, many
courts, including the District of Columbia Circuit, have abandoned the test. See, e.g., Beasley
v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The DeCoster court fashioned a new standard based on dictum in McMann,
wherein the Court suggested that the effectiveness of counsel should be measured by "the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 397 U.S. at 771. Rejecting
the argument that the right to effective counsel is grounded in the due process clause rather
than in the sixth amendment's "'more stringent requirements,'" the court stated that "a
defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his
diligent conscientious advocate." 487 F.2d at 1202 (quoting Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc)) (emphasis omitted). If the defendant establishes that his
representative has not met these standards, however, the conviction may nevertheless be
upheld if the government proves that the ineffective representation amounted to "harmless
error." Id. at 1204. For a thorough analysis of the DeCoster approach, see Tague, The Attempt
to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AMER. CaM. L. REv. 109 (1977). See
generally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1973); Baze-
lon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811 (1976); Finer, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNEL.L L. Rv. 1077 (1973); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
set-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 483 (1976); Note, Ineffective Representation
as a Basis for Relief from Convictions: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 1 (1977); Note, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 927 (1976); Comment, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 503.
"I See note 118 and accompanying text supra. Although an accused has the right to
conduct a pro se defense, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975), it is unclear whether
a court may permit a lay person to represent a defendant. In United States v. Grismore, 546
F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976), the tenth circuit held that a trial court's refusal to allow a defendant
a lay advocate was not unconstitutional, since "'[counsel' as referred to in the Sixth
Amendment. . . refers to a person authorized to the practice of law." Id. at 847. See People
v. Cox, 12 111. 2d 265, 269, 146 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1957); People v. Washington, 87 Misc. 2d 103,
105, 384 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976) (mem.). In dictum, however, the
Grismore court stated that the trial judge may, in his discretion permit "a lay person to
represent a criminal defendant." 546 F.2d at 847 (citing United States v. Jordon, 508 F.2d
750 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975)). Jordon, however, is readily distinguishable
from Grismore, since, before the court approved the layman's presence, the Jordon defendant
had waived his right to counsel and had proceeded with a pro se defense. 508 F.2d at 753.
For a common law history describing the evolution of the concept of "counsel", see Turner
v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 472-76 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v.
American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
'1 61 App. Div. 2d 309, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1978), aff'g 88 Misc. 2d 196, 387
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Nassau County Ct. 1977).
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dant's trial counsel was unlicensed does not require reversal of the
conviction."'
Feider involved the appeals of three defendants who had been
convicted of various felonies.12 All defendants had been represented
by Albert Silver, a unlicensed layman posing as an attorney. m Upon
learning that their defense had been conducted by a nonprofes-
sional, the defendants, arguing that they had been deprived of the
right to effective assistance of counsel,A unsuccessfully moved to
vacate the convictions.12s On appeal, the appellate division affirmed
61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
' Id. at 312-14, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13. Following a jury trial, defendant Felder was
convicted of robbery in the first degree and grand larcency in the third degree. Defendants
Tucker and Wright, on the advice of Silver, had pleaded guilty to lesser charged crimes.
' Id. at 315, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 413. Silver had never completed law school or been admit-
ted to practice in any jurisdiction. Despite his lack of professional qualifications, however,
Silver had been practicing law in Nassau County for a number of years and was appointed
pursuant to article 18-B of the County Law, N.Y. CouNTr LAW §§ 722 to 722-F (McKinney
Supp. 1977-1978), to represent two of the three Felder defendants. The third defendant in
Felder had retained Silver privately, without knowing he was unlicensed. 61 App. Div. 2d at
315, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
In New York, the unauthorized practice of law is a criminal offense. N.Y. JuD. LAW §
478 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). See also Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 12
SYRACUSE L. REv. 500 (1961).
lu 61 App. Div. 2d at 311, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 412. The Felder defendants sought relief under
CPL § 440.10, which is the codification of the common law writ of coram nobis. Coram nobis
is a post-judgment remedy which permits the reviewing court to reconsider the verdict and
correct any trial errors by vacating the conviction. The writ "has been employed for the
purpose .. . of calling up facts unknown at the time of the judgment, facts which affected
the validity and regularity of the judgment itself, facts which, if known, would have precluded
the judgment rendered." People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 144 N.E.2d 6,9, 165 N.Y.S.2d
6, 10 (1957) (Fuld, J., concurring), quoted in 6 Zmrr, NEw YoRK C UMNA PRACTICE 50.2.5
(1977). See generally id. 50.1-.6.
I's 61 App. Div. 2d at 309, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 412; see Harrington v. Martin, 263 App. Div.
922, 32 N.Y.S.2d 406 (3d Dep't 1942) (per curiam). In Harrington, the court upheld the
defendant's conviction although the individual representing him was not a member of the bar.
The Harrington court, however, may have been influenced by the defendant's decision to
enter a guilty plea pursuant to an independant arrangement with the district attorney. Id.
at 922, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 407; see People v. Felder, 61 App. Div. 2d at 316, 402 N.Y.S.2d at
415. Under these circumstances, the court may have assumed sub silentio that the defendant
had waived his right to counsel. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 12 ll.2d 265, 270, 146 N.E.2d 19, 22
(1957). In addition, there were indications in Harrington that the "attorney" was at one time
a member of the state bar. 263 App. Div. at 922, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 407; see People v. Taranow,
28 App. Div. 2d 562, 280 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1967) (mei.); cf. Dunn v. Eichoff, 35 N.Y.2d
698, 699, 319 N.E.2d 709, 709, 361 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (1974) (mei.) (civil jury verdict upheld
against party represented by disbarred attorney). In his dissenting opinion in Dunn, however,
Judge Wachtler stated:
This court should not condone the participation of a disbarred attorney in court
proceedings. Our State's policy on this is a firm one, and the Legislature has seen
fit to impose penal sanction to deter the practice (Judiciary Law, § 486). This
court's interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process is more immedi-
ate and our response should be more direct.
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the lower court's denial of the motions and upheld the convictions. 2"
Justice Titone, writing for the Felder majority, 117acknowledged
that the absence of duly licensed counsel at trial "raise[d] an issue
of constitutional dimension."'2 He pointed out, however, that the
presence of constitutional error does not mandate automatic rever-
sal if the conviction was obtained in a fundamentally fair manner.'2
The court relied primarily on the "harmless constitutional error"
doctrine, which was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chapman
v. California. 0 The Chapman Court stated that the presence of
minor constitutional infirmity at trial does not mandate reversal if
it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that the error. . . did not
contribute to the verdict . . . . ,,131 Reviewing the criminal proceed-
ings at issue in Felder, the majority found that each of the three
defendants had been represented "ably, diligently, competently and
conscientiously" by Silver. 32 Thus, Justice Titone held that Silver's
Id. at 700, 319 N.E.2d at 710, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (Wachtler, J., dissenting), quoted in People
v. Felder, 61 App. Div. 2d at 318, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Lower courts
also have denied coram nobis relief where a defendant was represented by an attorney who
had only been admitted to the bar of a foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., People v. Sardo, 15 Misc.
2d 69, 178 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Monroe County Ct. 1958); People v. Ragni, 159 N.Y.S.2d 358
(Westchester County Ct. 1957).
22 61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
' Justice Titone was joined in the majority by Justices Cohalan and Margett. Justice
Hawkins wrote a separate opinion in which Presiding Justice Mollen concurred.
212 61 App. Div. 2d at 311, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
12 Id. at 311-312, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 413. In reviewing the lower court convictions, the
Felder court stated:
The test of due process in such an instance is not whether the defendant had an
attorney, licensed or unlicensed, but whether under all of the circumstances his
conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common and
fundamental idea of what is fair and right ....
Id. at 312, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (citing People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill. App. 3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766
(1971)).
120 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"I Id. at 24. For applications of the Chapman standard, see Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969); People v. Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 366 N.E.2d 799, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977);
People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975).
122 61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 414. In evaluating the quality of legal assis-
tance provided by Silver, the Felder majority emphasized that the two defendants who had
entered guilty pleas were given relatively light sentences. These circumstances alone led the
court to conclude that these two defendants had been afforded the benefit of "effective
representation." Similarly, in the case of the third defendant, the court praised Silver's trial
strategy and apparently was influenced by the length of time taken by the jury to reach its
decision. Id. at 313, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 413. It is submitted that the Felder majority's reliance
on the outcome of the proceedings as a means of measuring the skill of an unlicensed attorney
was misdirected. By focusing on the results of Silver's advocacy, the court necessarily failed
to consider what a trained and licensed professional might have accomplished on behalf of
his clients. The fallacy in the majority's approach is that it fails to recognize the importance
of the numerous, minute decisions that attorneys must make during the course of a trial. It
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lack of professional credentials clearly did not contribute to the
defendants' convictions'3 and that reversals were therefore not re-
quired. '34
Justice Hawkins, writing for the dissent, took issue with the
majority's use of the "harmless error" doctrine.'3 5 Noting that the
doctrine had not been invoked in New York in a case involving
unlicensed counsel, 3 ' Justice Hawkins reasoned that the absence of
a duly admitted attorney in Felder was a violation of the defen-
dants' sixth amendment rights and required reversal.'37 In the dis-
sent's view, the competence displayed by Mr. Silver was irrelevant,
since the right to counsel presupposes representation by an attorney
duly admitted to the bar. '
is possible, for example, that an attorney with the requisite training would have moved
successfully to suppress damaging evidence and thereby obviated the need for the guilty pleas
entered by two of the Felder defendants.
The many variables that constitute "competent advocacy" cannot be evaluated effec-
tively at the appellate court level. When the attorney in question has been licensed by the
state, the court can rely on a presumption of competence. See, e.g., People v. Brandau, 19
Misc. 2d 477, 480, 189 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (Oneida County Ct. 1959) (quoting Feeley v. Ragen,
166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948)). When the advocate is unlicensed, however, no such presumption
is available, and the court is faced with the almost impossible task of "second-guessing" trial
counsel's strategy. It is suggested that the uncertainty of this inquiry renders impossible a
finding that the defendant's sixth amendment rights were protected "beyond a reasonable
doubt."
3 61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 414. But see note 132 supra.
'3 61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15.
'3 61 App. Div. 2d at 314, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
'3 Justice Hawkins noted that the cases relied on by the majority were readily distin-
guishable from the facts in Felder. In Harrington v. Martin, 263 App. Div. 922, 32 N.Y.S.2d
406 (3d Dep't 1942), wherein the court upheld the conviction despite the absence of licensed
counsel, the defendant had negotiated a "bargained plea" without consulting his attorney.
It was therefore possible to infer that the defendant had waived his right to counsel. Moreover,
it was not absolutely clear that the advocate in Harrington had never been licensed. Most
significantly, Harrington was decided before the sixth amendment had been applied to the
states in the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 117
supra. Similarly, in People v. Cornwall, 3 111. App. 3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971), the attorney
in question was not totally without credentials, since he had been admitted to practice in
another state. Justice Hawkins further observed that Dunn v. Eickhoff, 43 App. Div. 2d 580,
349 N.Y.S.2d 414 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 698, 319 N.E.2d 709, 361 N.Y.S.2d
348 (1974), was also inapposite since it involved a civil action in which the plaintiffs failed
to inform the court that their attorney had been disbarred. 61 App. Div. 2d at 314-19, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 415-17 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). In support of its position, the dissent discussed
People v. Washington, 87 Misc. 2d 103, 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976), a
case involving another defendant who had been represented by Silver. There, the court held
that "[a] defendant's constitutional right can only be satisfied by a lawyer admitted to
practice before the court." Id. at 105, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 692. The conviction in Washington was
reversed.
'37 61 App. Div. 2d at 318, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
'- Id. at 315, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that
a rule requiring reversal whenever a convicted defendant was represented by an unlicensed
1978]
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The decision in Felder appears to represent a serious misappli-
cation of the "harmless constitutional error" doctrine. Having found
at the outset that the absence of licensed counsel raised a constitu-
tional problem, the Felder court was obliged to apply the "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard articulated in Chapman. 9 It
is submitted that the same fact which led the court to a finding of
constitutional error, representation by a layman, was alone suffi-
cient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error was harm-
less.' Only by applying the less stringent "fundamental fairness"
standard implicit in the fourteenth amendment due process clause
could the court reasonably conclude that the defendants' rights had
been adequately protected at trial. 41 Although this less demanding
test has been used in New York to determine in the first instance,
whether a constitutional error has been committed, it has not been
applied to establish that an acknowledged constitutional defect was
merely "harmless error."'4 It is suggested that the better rule would
be to-treat the lack of licensed trial counsel as a per se violation of
the sixth amendment warranting automatic reversal.' Such a rule
would preclude a case-by-case evaluation of the quality of an unli-
censed practitioner's advocacy 44 and would be consistent with the
reasonable doubt standard established in Chapman.
The Felder majority has extended the harmless constitutional
error rule well beyond the doctrine's previously accepted bounda-
ries.4 5 By holding that the absence of qualified trial counsel can be
"harmless error," the court has placed the critically important sixth
amendment right to counsel in serious jeopardy.'46 It is hoped that
practitioner "could well open a Pandora's box." Id. at 318, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Hawkins,
J., dissenting). Justice Hawkins reasoned, however, that the ensuing legal problems could be
handled by the courts on a case-by-case basis, in much the same manner as the courts
handled the complex legal issues spawned by the landmark decisions in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 61 App. Div. 2d at 318,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
I" See text accompanying notes 130 & 132 supra.
11 See note 131 supra.
"I See note 129 supra.
112 See note 136 supra.
"1 Treating the absence of licensed counsel as reversible error per se would not necessar-
ily require reversal in instances where the defendant knowingly employs unlicensed counsel
and subsequently appeals an unfavorable decision on this ground. In such cases, the defen-
dant may be deemed to have waived his right to licensed counsel.
"' See note 137 supra.
"' See note 146 infra.
" It is suggested that the "harmless constitutional error" doctrine should not be applied
in cases such as Felder where the acknowledged constitutional error involved the conduct of
the entire trial. The harmless error doctrine originally arose out of the recognition that certain
errors committed at the trial level, while technically violative of the Constitution, may be
[Vol. 52:594
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the Court of Appeals will review the "harmless constitutional error"
doctrine at the earliest possible opportunity and establish clear and
narrowly drawn guidelines for its use. In the absence of such guide-
lines, the potential for this doctrine's abuse will remain a serious
threat to the carefully constructed rights of criminal defendants."7
Gregory Kehoe
ESTATES, POWERS, AND TRUSTS LAW
EPTL § 5-4.3: Recovery permitted for loss of consortium in wrongful
death action
Section 5-4.3 of the EPTL8 permits recovery in a wrongful
death action' "for pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's
disregarded if they did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Thus, in Chapman, the
Supreme Court stated that "some constitutional errors . . . are so unimportant and in-
significant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless,
not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." 386 U.S. at 22. Typically, the error
consists of the erroneous admission of physical or testimonial evidence in violation of the
defendant's fourth, sixth, or fourteenth amendment rights. E.g., People v. Smith, 60 App.
Div. 2d 566, 401 N.Y.S.2d 35a (4th Dep't 1978); People v. Trappier, 60 App. Div. 2d 896, 401
N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1978); People v. Cowan, 60 App. Div. 2d 634, 400 N.Y.S.2d 179 (2d
Dep't 1977). In such cases, before the error can be held to have been harmless, the court must
examine the admissible and inadmissible evidence presented by the prosecution and conclude
that the erroneously admitted evidence did not, in any way, contribute to the conviction. See
People v. Jones, 61 App. Div. 2d 264, 402 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1978). In essence, the
appellate court must decide whether the decision at the trial level would have been the same
had the evidence been excluded from consideration. In a case such as Felder, however, the
question does not call for a weighing of the relative impact of evidence. Rather, in order to
hold the error harmless, the court would have to conclude that representation by the layman
did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. It is submitted that the harmless error test
was not meant to permit the court to make such a subjective determination, nor is it precise
enough to properly evaluate the impact of a sixth amendment violation which is present at
every stage of the trial.
,, See note 146 supra.
"'EPTL § 5-4.3 provides in part:
Amount of recovery.
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where
issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the
persons for whose benefit the action is brought.
EPTL § 5-4.3.
"I The cause of action for wrongful death was unknown at common law. Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579 (1974); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 277 App. Div.
625, 630, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 545 (1951). Believing there was no valid justification for permitting
recovery for personal injuries in a negligence suit and denying such recovery in the event that
the personal injuries resulted in death, the English Parliament enacted The Fatal Accidents
Act, 1846, St. 8 & 10 Vict., c. 93. In re Meng, 96 Misc. 126, 128, 159 N.Y.S. 535; 537 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1916), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 69, 176 N.Y.S. 290 (1st Dep't 1919), rev'd mem.
1978]
